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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
of the Residential Rent Law in a proceeding before the Rent Administrator
who ruled that the tenant's apartment had not become decontrolled, since the
exchange was for the landlord's benefit and merely a substitution of controlled
housing accommodations. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but the
Appellate Division2 3 reversed, holding that the above statute demands only
two conditions; (1) a renting after April first, Nineteen Hundred fifty-three,
and (2) continuous occupancy by the owner for one year prior to renting.
Since petitioner landlord met both provisions, the disputed apartment must be
ruled decontrolled.
It is a common proposition that the literal meaning of an unambiguous
statute should be followed,2 4 but the purpose which the statute is to effect
must be given precedence.25 "A thing which is within the letter of the statute
is not within the statute unless it is within intent of the lawmakers." 26 Prior
lower court decisions2 7 on almost identical fact situations as the instant case,
have held that such exchanges for the landlord's benefit do not result in rent
decontrol for the tenant. The purpose of the instant statute was to induce
owner-occupiers to make their housing accommodations available to the rental
market. This being the purpose, the legislature could not have intended to
penalize a tenant with a controlled apartment who exchanges with a landlord,
for the latter's benefit.
The Court of Appeals felt the Rent Administrator had made an equitable
adjustment of the interests of the parties, the landlord getting the larger apart-
ment and the tenant getting the landlord's apartment, subject to rent control.
The Court made reference to decisions which allowed departure from the literal
meaning of a statute2" and held that the Rent Administrator's determination
was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and a clear case for administrative
discretion. In giving great weight to the administrator's interpretation of the
rent control statute, under diverse conditions, the court reaffirmed a policy, i.e.
to leave undisturbed an administrative ruling where it is not clearly shown to
be contrary to law.
29
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT COVENANTS IN A LEASE
Landlord and tenant entered into a lease whereby premises were to be used
for storing and shipping of goods. The certificate of occupancy then in effect
permitted the first floor of the leased premises to be used as a dance hall. In
the lease, the landlord covenanted to make application to obtain a certificate
23. 7 A.D.2d 1004, 184 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1958).
24. Lawrence Const. Co. v. New York, 293 N.Y. 634, 59 N.E.2d 630 (1944).
25. People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 8 N.E.2d 313 (1939).
26. River Brand Rice Mills Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d
545 (1953).
27. Brettler v. Weaver, 14 Misc. 2d 1031, 177 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Ashen v. McGoldrick, 17 Misc. 2d 23, 189 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
28. New York Post Co. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957); See
also, supra notes 25 and 26.
29. People v. McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 113 N.E. 795 (1916); See also, Ry. Comm'r
v. Rowen and Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1914); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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of occupancy authorizing the use of the demised premises according to the
terms of the lease. No time was fixed for the performance of this covenant but
there was a further covenant to the effect that if the landlord exhausted all his
remedies and the certificate was "refused," the tenant could vacate the premises
within 60 days after notice from the landlord, and the lease would be at an end.
Tenant entered into possession on March 1, 1953 and, on April 27, 1954
it sent a letter to the landlord informing it that if a new certificate of occu-
pancy was not forthcoming by June 30th, the tenant would deem the lease
terminated. This step was taken after many oral complaints to the landlord
produced no tangible result, and even though during the 14 months of posses-
sion no violations were placed against the premises by an official agency. The
landlord filed for a certificate of occupancy after receiving this letter, and five
days before the deadline set by the tenant, landlord was notified that the
certificate was held up because of storage of combustibles on the premises.
Tenant moved out on the 30th of June and with the combustibles removed, a
certificate was issued.
The instant action, 56-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigamn
Corp. 0 was commenced for the recovery of rent accruing under the lease after
tenant had vacated premises. The question was raised as to whether the
covenant to pay rent was conditional upon the landlord's procurement of a
suitable certificate. Efforts to formulate distinctions of dependence and inde-
pendence of promises or covenants have proved to be a difficult undertaking,
and it can only be best determined "by the intention and meaning of the parties
as expressed by them, and by the application of common sense to each case." 31
Of course, the general rule exists that a covenant which goes to only a part and
not to the whole consideration of the contract is an independent covenant,
whereas covenants which are dependent or conditional are such that perform-
ance of one depends on the prior performance of the other.
The lease itself was not void for illegality. It contemplated a corrected
and hence a lawfully occupied premise, and it would fail as a valid contract
only if the contemplated correction became impossible. 32 The bar to legal use
was readily correctible and the parties must be deemed by the language which
they elected to use in the instrument to have intended that it be corrected.
However, where a lease or contract is incurably violative of some ordinance or
regulation designed for the protection of property or human life, a court will
refuse to lend it enforcement.
In an action for rent, a tenant can set up a defense that he was evicted,
either constructively or otherwise. An actual eviction is the forcible ouster of
the tenant, but in a constructive eviction the tenant has the burden of showing
30. 56-70 58th Street Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., 5 N.Y.2d 557, 186
N.Y.S.2d 583 (1959).
31. Rosenthal Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 320,
123 N.E. 766, 768 (1919).
32. Elkar Realty Corp. v. Kamada, 6 A.D.2d 155, 157, 175 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (1st
Dep't 1958).
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such an unlawful interference with its possession and use of the demised
premises so as to amount to a substantial impairment.33 However, there can
be no constructive eviction unless there is a surrender of the possession of the
premises;3 4 and if a defendant remains in possession, then he must pay rent.35
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals in a divided opinion found that
since the certificate had not been "refused," and the landlord was still seeking
its issuance, the tenant was not justified in vacating the premises and ceasing
to pay rent. However a shadow is cast on the decision by the concurring
opinion of Judge Fuld. Concurring with the opinion of three judges in holding
tenant liable, Judge Fuld also held that the covenants were dependent-thus
he agreed with the three dissenters who became the majority in the particular
holding that the continued payments of rent depended on the landlords secur-
ing a certificate of occupancy. However, Judge Fuld felt that his sole ground
for favoring the landlord was because "the tenant in this case waived its right
to demand timely, compliance by the landlord." Since a motion for reargument
has been granted to the parties involved to the extent of allowing a reargument
of the question concerning the tenant's alleged waiver of its right to demand
timely compliance by the landlord,36 it might be interesting to explore "waiver"
a bit further.
Before a party may rescind for failure to perform a contract containing
no fixed date for performance it is incumbent upon that party to give notice
declaring his intention to rescind if the contract is not performed within a
reasonable time. Not only must the time be reasonable, but it must also be
specified in the notice.37 What constitutes time is, of course, a question of
fact. 8 In the present fact situation, the conversation between landlord and
tenant as to complaints of delay, specified no definite time as to when correc-
tion was to take place and, therefore was not such a warning to the defendant
as the law requires.3 9 However, the written notice was sufficient. Time is not
the essence of a contract which is to be performed within a reasonable time,
but either party can make it so whenever he desires by simply giving reasonable
notice to that effect.40 Even though there is a waiver, it can be negated by a
reasonable notice and stating that the contract will be rescinded if the notice is
not complied with.41 The notice must be clear and definite both as to time and
the effect of non-performance.
42
It appears, therefore, that since four judges held the covenants involved
33. 1 THoMpsoN, NEW YoRx LAW or LA DLoRD AND TENANT § 270; Herstein v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 117, 172 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1958).
34. Edgerton v. Page, 20 N.Y. 281 (1859).
35. Hizington v. Eldred Refining Co. of N.Y., 235 App. Div. 486, 257 N.Y. Supp.
464 (4th Dep't 1932).
36. 6 N.Y.2d 878 (1959).
37. 3 CoRian, CoNTRAcrs § 722, p. 820.
38. Murray Co. v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 241 N.Y. 455, 150 N.E. 514 (1926).
39. Taylor v. Goelet, 208 N.Y. 253, 260, 101 N.E. 867, 868 (1913).
40. Ibid.
41. Lawson v. Hogan, 93 N.Y. 39 (1883).
42. Boswell v. United States, 123 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1941).
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herein to be dependent on each other, the tenant had a right to rescind the
contract for failure to perform. The question is, was there a reasonable time
given by the tenant to the landlord in the letter dated April 27, 1954. It gave
till June 30th for the landlord to comply, and it appears that this letter made
time of the essence and if it could be shown that the time was reasonable in
the light of all surrounding circumstances, then landlord breached his covenant
and tenant had a right to rescind.
INDIAN LANDS; JURISDICTION TO DETERmiNE TITLE
Section 8 of the New York Indian Law states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, no person shall settle or reside
upon any lands owned or occupied by any nation, tribe or band; and
any lease, contract or agreement permitting such residence shall be
void. The county judge of the county in which the lands are situated,
upon complaint made to him, of such illegal residence, shall if he
thinks there is reasonable ground therefore, issue a notice directed
to the person against whom complaint is made, requiring him to
appear before such judge at a time and place therein specified, to
answer the complaint. Such judge shall attend at the time and place
mentioned in the notice, and upon proof of the personal service of the
notice, shall take proof of the facts alleged in the complaint, and shall
determine whether such person is an intruder upon the lands of such
reservation. If he shall determine that such person is an intruder, he
shall issue a warrant to the sheriff of the county commanding him,
within ten days after the receipt thereof, to remove such person from
such lands. The district attorney of any county in which reservation
lands are situated, upon written application of the chiefs, councilors
or head men of the nation, tribe or band owning such lands shall
make complaint of any intrusions on such lands, and cause the
intruders to be removed.43
Does Section 8 of the Indian Law give a County Court jurisdiction to
decide right or title in land when an intruder proceeding is brought under it?
In the case of Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co.,44 a proceeding was
brought by the District Attorney of Suffolk County pursuant to Section 8 of
the Indian Law. The proceeding involved a nine acre parcel of land to which
both the Indians and appellants claimed title. There was a disputed issue of
fact as to where the boundary line of the reservation was situated. This issue
was resolved in favor of the Indians. Appellants were adjudged intruders, and
the County Court directed issuance of a warrant for their removal from the
land. The Appellate Division affirmed the order, but in its decision stated
that the order removing the appellants as intruders did not determine right or
title in the land.45 On appeal, the ruling of the Appellate Division concerning
the right or title in the land was held to be erroneous, and as a result, the
43. N.Y. INDL.%N LAW § 8.
44. 207 Misc. 114, 137 N.Y.S.2d 570 (County Ct. 1955).
49. Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 4 A.D.2d 749, 165 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2nd Dep't
1957).
